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The European Central Bank: Lender of Last 





The sovereign debt crisis has made it clear that central banking is more than keeping inflation 
low.  Central banks are  also responsible for financial stability. An essential tool in 
maintaining financial stability is provided by the capacity of the central bank to be the lender 
of last resort in the banking system. In this paper I argue that the ECB should also be the 
lender of last resort in the government bond markets of the monetary union, very much like 
the central banks in countries that issue debt in their own currencies are. This is necessary to 
prevent countries from being pushed into bad equilibria by self-fulfilling fears of liquidity 
crises in a monetary union. I also survey the different arguments that have been formulated by 
opponents of the view that the ECB should be the lender of last resort in the government bond 
markets. 
JEL-Code: F330. 
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 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Introduction	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠdiscovered	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠto	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠstability.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdiscovery	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwas	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠmassively	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠsave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhesitate	 ﾠto	 ﾠexert	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠaside	 ﾠall	 ﾠfears	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ inflation,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fiscal	 ﾠ implications	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
lending.	 ﾠ
Things	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠerupted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠThen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ gripped	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ hesitation.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ stop-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐go	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ ensued	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
provided	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ moments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
withdraw	 ﾠit	 ﾠat	 ﾠanother	 ﾠone.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhit	 ﾠSpain	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠin	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠagain	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Is	 ﾠthere	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠ
market?	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Fragility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠby	 ﾠdescribing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweakness	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠ union.	 ﾠ National	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
“foreign”	 ﾠcurrency,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠone	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbondholders	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ maturity.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ contrasts	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ “stand	 ﾠ alone”	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠcurrencies.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠallows	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcash	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bondholders.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstand-ﾭ‐alone	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ absence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ guarantee	 ﾠ makes	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠand	 ﾠforces	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontagion,	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
banking	 ﾠ systems	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ lack	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lender	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ resort.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ systems,	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ deposit	 ﾠ holders	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
withdraw	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdeposits.	 ﾠWhen everybody does this at the same time the banks will 	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
not have enough cash.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsets	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsound	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdegenerates	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠas	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠcash	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠassets	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠ
pulling	 ﾠdown	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprices.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠasset	 ﾠprices	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠmany	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠfind	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠinsolvent.	 ﾠThis banking system instability was solved by mandating the central 
bank to be a lender of last resort – and the neat thing about this solution is that, when 
deposit holders are confident that it exists, it rarely has to be used. 
The	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ system.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ solvency	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ arise	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ (Greece)	 ﾠ
bondholders,	 ﾠfearing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworst,	 ﾠsell	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠtriggers	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠother	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcash	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ bondholders.	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ selling	 ﾠ activity	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠturns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠ
crisis.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠenough	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠany	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠinsolvent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdistrust	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpush	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠway	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium1..	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠ rates,	 ﾠ recessionary	 ﾠ forces,	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ problems,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠinsolvency.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdegenerate	 ﾠinto	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠ
problems.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmandating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ
resort	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ
pushed	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bad	 ﾠ equilibrium.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ said	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ self-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠ
nature	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠfailure,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠinsufficient	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠ pushes	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ situation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ insufficient	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
solve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcoordination	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠby	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠlending	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠSee	 ﾠDe	 ﾠGrauwe(2011)	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠelaborated	 ﾠfurther.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠKopf(2011).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
formal	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠsee	 ﾠCalvo(1988)	 ﾠand	 ﾠGros(2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexists	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠEichengreen,	 ﾠet	 ﾠ
al.(2005).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠ
(Obstfeld(1994)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
Failure	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠlending	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠ union	 ﾠ carries	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ forcing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ
lending	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhit	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrisis.	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlending	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexpensive.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmost	 ﾠoften	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠare	 ﾠmany	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠ
larger	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbank	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ250%	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
GDP	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcompares	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠto	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠratio	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠapproximately	 ﾠ80%	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source: IMF, Global financial stability report, 2008 
	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmandating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠone,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
mandate	 ﾠis	 ﾠequally	 ﾠintense.	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠreview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
formulated	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠrole	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Risk	 ﾠof	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠargument	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ inflation.	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ buying	 ﾠ












Figure 1: Bank liabilities as percent GDP (2008) 	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsaid,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠleading	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠinflation.	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalways	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠas	 ﾠMilton	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠtaught	 ﾠus?	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
First,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠbase	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠ
stock.	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ buys	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ assets)	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠbase	 ﾠ(currency	 ﾠin	 ﾠcirculation	 ﾠand	 ﾠbanks’	 ﾠdeposits	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠbank).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
periods	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ crises	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ monetary	 ﾠ aggregates	 ﾠ tend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ
disconnected.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠexample	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠobserves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠboth	 ﾠaggregates	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠconnected.	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠon,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisconnect	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠquite	 ﾠspectacular.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ save	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ system,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ massively	 ﾠ piled	 ﾠ up	 ﾠ assets	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠsheets,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcounterpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠ
base2.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock(M3)	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ
declined	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhappened	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠpiled	 ﾠ
up	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠusing	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠextend	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐
banking	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Another	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠerupts,	 ﾠagents	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠcash	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsafety	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠ
decides	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cash,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ turns	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ financial	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ
recession	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠa	 ﾠdepression,	 ﾠas	 ﾠagents	 ﾠscramble	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcash.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠexerts	 ﾠits	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupplies	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
money	 ﾠbase,	 ﾠit	 ﾠstops	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdeflationary	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠallow	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠinflation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Al	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwell	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠby	 ﾠMilton	 ﾠFriedman,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfather	 ﾠof	 ﾠmonetarism	 ﾠ
who	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuspected	 ﾠof	 ﾠfavoring	 ﾠinflationary	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠbook	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐
authored	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAnna	 ﾠSchwartz,	 ﾠA	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠHistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠDepression	 ﾠwas	 ﾠso	 ﾠintense	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
perform	 ﾠits	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠbase	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠNote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠFed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
balance	 ﾠsheet	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠpronounced.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠin	 ﾠappendix.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
appears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠtimid	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Bank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchwartz(1961).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠon	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ333,	 ﾠ	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠSchwartz	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠshowing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ1929-ﾭ‐33	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠstock	 ﾠdeclined,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠbase	 ﾠ
(“high	 ﾠpowered	 ﾠmoney”)	 ﾠincreased.	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchwartz	 ﾠargued	 ﾠforcefully	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ money	 ﾠ base	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ increased	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
achieve	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ buying	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ securities.	 ﾠ Much	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ chagrin	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Friedman	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchwartz,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠThose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ
fear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinflationary	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwell	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
read	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠand	 ﾠSchwartz(1961).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠ unfounded	 ﾠ fear	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ inflationary	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ lender	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ resort	 ﾠ
activity	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠpolicymaking.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠ
decided	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠbuying	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠand	 ﾠItalian	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds,	 ﾠit	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ sterilize	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ purchases	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ money	 ﾠ base	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
withdrawing	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠunfortunate	 ﾠdecision.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
absolutely	 ﾠno	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠyearly	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠM3	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ1%,	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
growth	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4.5%	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠwould	 ﾠstabilize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠat	 ﾠ2%.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠFriedman	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalive	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠchances	 ﾠare	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠberate	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ mistakes	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ US	 ﾠ Fed	 ﾠ during	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Great	 ﾠ
Depression.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠBase	 ﾠand	 ﾠM3	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠ
(2007=100)	 ﾠ
M3	 ﾠ
Money	 ﾠBase	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
Fiscal	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
bond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠconsequences.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠ
fail	 ﾠto	 ﾠservice	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdebts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠwill	 ﾠmake	 ﾠlosses.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠborne	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠtaxpayers.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠby	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
committing	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ taxpayers.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ avoid	 ﾠ operations	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ mix	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠGoodfriend(2011)).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
All	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ sounds	 ﾠ reasonable.	 ﾠ Yet	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ fails	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ recognize	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ
operations	 ﾠ (including	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ exchange	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ operations)	 ﾠ carry	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ risk	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
losses	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠbuys	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠoperation,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠinvolved,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
issuer	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdefault.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠthen	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank3.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠway	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠcan	 ﾠincur	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠbuying	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠreally	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
bank	 ﾠshould	 ﾠabstain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠoperation.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠstop	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠ bank.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ truth	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ perform	 ﾠ (risky)	 ﾠ open	 ﾠ
market	 ﾠ operation.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ potentially	 ﾠ loss	 ﾠ making	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
deter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank.	 ﾠLosses	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠdesirable,	 ﾠto	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠstability.	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfragility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion.	 ﾠI	 ﾠargued	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐fulfilling	 ﾠway	 ﾠdrive	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
default	 ﾠ becomes	 ﾠ inevitable.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ lender	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ last	 ﾠ resort	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbad	 ﾠequilibrium.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ banks	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ successful	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ losses,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ fiscal	 ﾠ
consequences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠstriking	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠreluctant	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsecurities	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠ
represent	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ23%	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheet,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠFED	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠwith	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshown	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠSwiss	 ﾠexperience.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
Bank	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ England	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ percentages	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ (56%	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 87%).	 ﾠ
Similarly,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ smaller	 ﾠ proportion	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ total	 ﾠ amount	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ (5.5%)	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ FED	 ﾠ (11%)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Bank	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
England(17.7%).	 ﾠ Surprisingly	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ faces	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ strongest	 ﾠ criticism	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠits	 ﾠholdings	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠholds	 ﾠ
relatively	 ﾠfew	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsecurities	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠway	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠless	 ﾠ
risk,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB’s	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreverse	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠ
sheet,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ risk,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ commits	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ taxpayers	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFed	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland.	 ﾠSurprisingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
criticism	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠso	 ﾠmany	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ	 ﾠassets	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ FED	 ﾠ BoE	 ﾠ
Gov.	 ﾠSecuruties	 ﾠas	 ﾠ%	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠassets	 ﾠ 22,9%	 ﾠ 56,3%	 ﾠ 87,3%	 ﾠ
Percent	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠ 5,5%	 ﾠ 11,3%	 ﾠ 17,7%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠValiante	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard?	 ﾠ
Like	 ﾠwith	 ﾠall	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠgives	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
issue	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠdebt.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠrisk.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
no	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
terrible	 ﾠmistake	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠabandon	 ﾠits	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ
resort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠto	 ﾠabandon	 ﾠits	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ deal	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ impose	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ constrain	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠin	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠdebt,	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlike	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠtackled	 ﾠby	 ﾠimposing	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠon	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠby	 ﾠbanks.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
separate	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ concerns.	 ﾠ Liquidity	 ﾠ provision	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ performed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank;	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠ institution,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supervisor.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
strategy	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort,	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠguaranteeing	 ﾠunlimited	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
times	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠirrespective	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠto	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupervisory	 ﾠ
authority	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulating	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupervising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbanks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠshould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠ
assumes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠand	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulating	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ supervising	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ debt	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ governments.	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
metaphor:	 ﾠ When	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ house	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ burning	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fire	 ﾠ department	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ responsible	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
extinguishing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfire.	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠdepartment	 ﾠ(police	 ﾠand	 ﾠjustice)	 ﾠis	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
investigating	 ﾠwrongdoing	 ﾠand	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠif	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ kept	 ﾠ separate.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ fire	 ﾠ department	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ responsible	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ fire	 ﾠ
extinguishing	 ﾠand	 ﾠpunishment	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠfire	 ﾠdepartment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠtries	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfail	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠits	 ﾠduty	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠBagehot	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠ
Ideally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠshould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
governments)	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠinsolvent.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠas	 ﾠformulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠBagehot(1873).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
strongly	 ﾠ felt	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ economists	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Northern	 ﾠ Europe	 ﾠ (see	 ﾠ Plenum	 ﾠ der	 ﾠ
Ökonomen(2011)	 ﾠ).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbailout	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠor	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠinsolvent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠcorrect.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoctrine,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ distinguish	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ solvency	 ﾠ crises.	 ﾠ Most	 ﾠ
economists	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠwould	 ﾠagree	 ﾠthat	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠis	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠ bailed	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Central	 ﾠ Bank.	 ﾠ But	 ﾠ what	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ Spain,	 ﾠ Ireland,	 ﾠ
Portugal,	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠand	 ﾠBelgium?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrightest	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠagree	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ countries’	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ just	 ﾠ illiquid	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠnow?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠargued	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠerupt	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠoften	 ﾠa	 ﾠmix	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠand	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠLiquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
debt	 ﾠ issued	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ therefore	 ﾠ quickly	 ﾠ degenerate	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ solvency	 ﾠ
problems.	 ﾠ Solvency	 ﾠ problems	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ lead	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ crises	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ intensify	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
solvency	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠshould	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠor	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠilliquid	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsolvent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdoctrine.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ fact	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ even	 ﾠ worse.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ doctrine	 ﾠ leads	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ paradox.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ were	 ﾠ easy	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
separate	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠso.	 ﾠThus	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcame	 ﾠunder	 ﾠpressure,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsuffered	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠor	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠ
problem.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠrightly	 ﾠso.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠBagehot	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠwould	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠconclusion:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠbank	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbailout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsolvent	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠand	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseparated,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
last	 ﾠresort.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠcare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems4.	 ﾠWho	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdays?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBagehot	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠremembered,	 ﾠBagehot	 ﾠput	 ﾠforward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠof	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠbank	 ﾠshould	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠunlimited	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpenalty	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
seen	 ﾠby	 ﾠBagehot	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠcare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠby	 ﾠcommitting	 ﾠitself	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠunlimited	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
soon	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠA	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠfree	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ(say	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
German	 ﾠbond	 ﾠrate)	 ﾠby	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠ200	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ(it	 ﾠcould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ




	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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4	 ﾠThis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠof	 ﾠAlan	 ﾠGreenspan.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee	 ﾠGreenspan(2007).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
Legal	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB’s	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
violation	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠstatutes,	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclaimed,	 ﾠforbids	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠoperations.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcareful	 ﾠ
reading	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreaty,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ18	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ“Protocol	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStatute	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠSystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBanks	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠ Central	 ﾠ Bank”	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ very	 ﾠ clear	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ states	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ “the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoperate	 ﾠin	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠby	 ﾠbuying	 ﾠand	 ﾠselling	 ﾠ(..)	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ marketable	 ﾠ instruments”.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ marketable	 ﾠ
instruments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnowhere	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠis	 ﾠforbidden	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠand	 ﾠsell	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠin	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠprohibited	 ﾠis	 ﾠspelled	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ21:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠ
“overdrafts	 ﾠor	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠfacilities”	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠentities,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠpurchase	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ“debt	 ﾠinstruments”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠentities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
confused.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠstatute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠis	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠopen	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠoperations.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ ECB	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ credit	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ governments.	 ﾠ What	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠholders	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbonds.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠholders	 ﾠare	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠno	 ﾠway	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠdeficits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprohibition	 ﾠon	 ﾠbuying	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
budget	 ﾠdeficit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
EFSF	 ﾠand	 ﾠESM:	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠsurrogates	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠECB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠit	 ﾠcleat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠits	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠ
resort	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠforced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠsurrogate	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠESM)5.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ
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5	 ﾠGros	 ﾠand	 ﾠMayer(2010)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠto	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠ
Fund	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnever	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠstop	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
forces	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontagion,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcash	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalways	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ out	 ﾠ sovereign	 ﾠ bond	 ﾠ holders.	 ﾠ Even	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resources	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ
institution	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdoubled	 ﾠor	 ﾠtripled	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ€440	 ﾠ
billion	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsufficient.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠunlimited	 ﾠ
amounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠcash	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠguarantee.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠESM)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwin	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ solvency.	 ﾠ First,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ task	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EFSF	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ governments	 ﾠ experiencing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ shortage.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠrole	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠstrengthened	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
July	 ﾠ 21,	 ﾠ 2011,	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ allow	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ EFSF	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ buy	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bonds	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ secondary	 ﾠ
market.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠ
problem	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠprovision.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠtough	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseek	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠassistance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠare	 ﾠconflicting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EFSF	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ guided	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ moral	 ﾠ hazard	 ﾠ concerns	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ tends	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ restrict	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ add	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ liquidity	 ﾠ provisions,	 ﾠ thereby	 ﾠ preventing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ resolution	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠand	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthese	 ﾠto	 ﾠdegenerate	 ﾠinto	 ﾠsolvency	 ﾠcrises.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
argued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠhazard	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseparated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠESM	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
ill-ﾭ‐suited	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ crisis	 ﾠ management.	 ﾠ Each	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ maintains	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ veto	 ﾠ power.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEFSF	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠESM	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontinuously	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠby	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ(“true	 ﾠFins”	 ﾠin	 ﾠFinland,	 ﾠGeert	 ﾠWilders	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠNetherlands).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ EFSF	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ ESM	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ substitute	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ECB.	 ﾠ It	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
therefore	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠit	 ﾠwants	 ﾠto	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ




	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠECB	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠunduly	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank.	 ﾠFinancial	 ﾠstability	 ﾠshould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠradar	 ﾠ
screen	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbank.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠto	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
endemic	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunlimited	 ﾠfiring	 ﾠ
power,	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠstabilizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
system.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠold	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠfleeing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
responsibility.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠorder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠin	 ﾠstabilizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEurozone,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfully	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠexert	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
function	 ﾠof	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠconfidence,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ banking	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ ensures	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ central	 ﾠ bank	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ rarely	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ
lender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠsupport.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB’s	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠbond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficient.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠorder	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠ prevent	 ﾠ future	 ﾠ crises	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Eurozone	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ steps	 ﾠ towards	 ﾠ further	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠunification	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠwere	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠ
recently	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ European	 ﾠ Council	 ﾠ decided	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ strengthen	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠ budgetary	 ﾠ processes	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ national	 ﾠ macoeconomic	 ﾠ policies.	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ
decisions,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ insufficient	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ fundamental	 ﾠ changes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠare	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
bank	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠlender	 ﾠof	 ﾠlast	 ﾠresort	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
bond	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnever-ﾭ‐ending	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠof	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠcreation.	 ﾠ
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Total	 ﾠassets	 ﾠECB,	 ﾠFED,	 ﾠBoE	 ﾠ
(2007=100)	 ﾠ
ECB	 ﾠ
FED	 ﾠ
BoE	 ﾠ